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INTRODUCTION: T HE DOG T HAT D IDN'T BARK

It is difficult enough identifying areas within a current field of scholar

ship that are underdeveloped and in need of further attention. In science, one
thinks of missing elements in the periodic table or planets in a solar system

that our calculations tell us must be there but that our telescopes have not
2
yet spotted.1 In civil-rights law, one thinks of such areas as women's sports

or the problems of intersectional groups, such as women of color or gay
black men. 3 One also thinks of issues that current events are constantly

thrusting forward, such as discrimination against Arabs4 or execution of
6

children5 or the mentally retarded.

What of challenges that do not come readily to mind because they lie

outside the current paradigm-problems that we do not readily think of as

civil-rights issues at all, or that are so radically unlike those we do recognize
that they require a leap of the imagination to see them as such?7 Here, we
lack a template-a periodic table. We cannot easily make the link between

the familiar and the unknown. The new issue does not lie on the same plane

as those we know, so that mental extrapolation and interpolation do not
readily lead us to it.

Issues of this kind require us to expand our conceptual repertory and

learn to think in different ways. They require us to listen for "the dog that
doesn't bark" 8-to flip a structure such as conventional civil-rights law and
look at it sideways. They require us to look at that structure as a whole and

consider what might be missing.

This is a good time to step back and survey recent writings about race.

The fiftieth anniversary of Brown v.

I.

Board of Education9

has brought forth a

See, e.g., Mary Carmichael, Astronomy: Third From Gliese, NEWSWEEK, June 27, 2005,

at 12.

2. E.g., Deborah Brake, Revisiting Title !X's Feminist Legacy: Moving Beyond the Three
Part Test, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 453 (2004).
3. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv.
581 (1990) (discussing problems ofintersectional groups, such as black women).
See, e.g., Charles Pope, Fear Grows that War on Terror is Trampling Rights, SEATILE
Sept. 10, 2002, at A l (discussing concern that antiterror measures might
endanger privacy and civil liberties).

4.

POST-INTELLIGENCER,

5.

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

6.

See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

7.

See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, 2 INTERNA
(2d ed. 1970) (discussing process by which scientific
paradigms succeed and replace each other).

TIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED SCIENCE

See the Sherlock Holmes detective story, ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE HOUND OF THE
(John Murray, 26th impression 1965) (1902), in which the fictional detective solves a
mystery by noticing that neighborhood dogs did not bark at a time when everyone had thought the
crime took place.
8.

BASKERVILLES

9.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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wealth of scholarshi{>-retrospective, critical, and celebratory.

10

The three

books that I take as illustrative are each, in their way, excellent. Reflective,

even ruminative, All Deliberate Speed interweaves the story of author
11
Charles Ogletree's life with national events that took place during the same
period, such as the Brown decision, the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas hear

ings, and the lawsuit for black reparations growing out of the 1921 Tulsa
riots. Ogletree's book brings these events to life, while reinforcing how

much remains to be done to effectuate Brown's mandate. In Whitewashing
1
1
Race, Michael K. Brown 2 and his coauthors 3 put forward a scorching cri

tique of an emerging neoconservative approach to race and show how it has
produced a new type of tough-minded, "realist" racism exemplified by

Stephen and Abigail Themstrom's America in Black and White: One Nation,
15
14
lndivisible. Alexander Tsesis's book audaciously seeks to reorient racial

jurisprudence so that it avoids the cultural inertia and doctrinal baggage that

recent books-including the other two reviewed here--document. He seeks
to place such jurisprudence on sounder footing.

Although these otherwise strong books contribute greatly to current

knowledge, they-like much recent writing about race-nevertheless devote

scant attention to two issues that ought to be on the agenda of every serious

treatment of race: white privilege and the place of nonblack groups such as

Latinos and Asian Americans in the civil-rights equation. Not only for Afri

can Americans, but also for other groups, two forces--oppression and
favoritism-maintain white supremacy, so that ending one without attention
16
to the other would do little to improve matters. If the demise of formal,
state-sponsored racism has left in place a system of informal favors, ex

changes, informational networks, old-boy references, and college-entrance

criteria by which whites see to their own, the system of white-over-black
1
power relations will hardly budge. 7 White privilege thus demands the seri

ous attention of every race scholar.

10. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS (2004) (questioning whether Brown's
contribution to blacks' advancement was as great as its supporters say and positing that equal school
funding might have been a worthier goal).
11.

Jesse Climenko Professor and Vice Dean of Clinical Programs, Harvard Law School.

12.

Professor and Chair of the Department of Politics, University of California at Santa Cruz.

13. Martin Carnoy, Professor of Education and Economics, Stanford University; Elliott
Currie, Lecturer in Legal Studies, University of California at Berkeley; Troy Duster, Professor of
Sociology, New York University, and Chancellor's Professor, University of California at Berkeley;
David B. Oppenheimer, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development, Golden
Gate University School of Law; Marjorie M. Shultz, Professor of Law, University of California at
Berkeley (Boalt Hall); David Wellman, Professor of Community Studies, University of California at
Santa Cruz.
14.

STEPHEN THERNSTROM

WHITE]

15.

& ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE

(1997) [hereinafter THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM,
(providing a stinging critique of race-conscious remedies).

NATION, INDIVISIBLE

AMERICA IN BLACK AND

Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.

16.

See infra Section III. B.

17.

See infra Section III.B.
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By the same token, a simplistic approach that takes two groups, the

white and the black, as constitutive can do little to counter the types of dis

crimination that nonblack groups, such as Latinos, Asians, and Native
18
Such a treatment will only be able to redress discrimi

Americans, suffer.

nation targeting these other groups to the extent that they succeed in
analogizing their discrimination to a type that blacks encounter. A Filipino,

for example, who suffers accent discrimination on the job,19 or a Latina un

able to perform jury duty because she understands Spanish and cannot be
0
counted on to pay attention to the fumbling court interpreter,2 may easily

find herself without a remedy. Blacks do not suffer discrimination based on

a foreign-sounding accent, national origin, immigration status, or inability to
1
speak English proficiently. 2 Hence a Filipino, Asian, or Latino complaining

of one of these forms of treatment is apt to find little case or statutory law in
his or her favor. The black-white binary paradigm of race thus requires ex

pansion to deal with our increasingly multicultural, multiracial society-and

even, sometimes, to do justice to the black cause. 22

These two issues-white privilege and the black-white binary of race

are the dogs that don't bark. Strikingly absent from much recent writing
about race, they tell us a great deal about mindset,2 3 p resupposition, and, in
4
some cases, intellectual laziness,2 racial favoritism,2 and denial. Their ab
sence mars the imagination, reach, and analytical power of many otherwise

very good books.

This Review proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the three books. Part

II highlights what is valuable in each and points out a few minor respects in
which they fall short. Parts III and IV identify a deeper shortcoming: the

failure to come to terms with white privilege and the black-white binary

paradigm of race, issues that lie outside the conventional paradigm of race

scholarship but that are becoming more salient with each passing day.

18.

See infra Section ill.A.

19. See. e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1333-40 (1991) (discussing the
case of a Filipino job applicant with a heavy accent who was denied a job as a Department of Motor
Vehicles clerk).
20.

Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).

21. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino
Critical Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 75 Tux. L. REV. 1 181 (1997) (book review); Juan
F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial
T hought, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1213 (1997).
22. See infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text (explaining how single-focus treatment
denies one group of allies as well as a broader perspective on how the checkerboard of racial pro
gress operates, with groups periodically advancing while others regress and with all of them
sometimes pitted against each other for crumbs).
23. For example, "To me, civil rights means (a) rights of all minorities, (b) rights of African
Americans, or (c) rights of minorities, but not the privileges of whiteness."
24. For example, "I've been studying and writing about (a), (b), or (c) above for all these
years; why do I have to change now?"
25. For example, "All my friends are (a), (b), or (c); their experience is really central to racial
discourse, so I'll forget all those other issues, for now."
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I. T HREE R ECENT BOOKS ON R ACE
A. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., All Deliberate Speed:
Reflections on the First Half Century of

Brown

v.

Board of Education

Part memoir, part legal history, and part legal critique, All Deliberate
Speed is well-paced and a very good read. Beginning with the author's early
school years as a "Brown baby" (Ogletree, pp. 15-42), the book takes the
reader through the legal strategy that led up to Brown v. Board of Education

(Ogletree, pp. 3-13, 111-27), juxtaposes the late Supreme Court Justice

Thurgood Marshall with current Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas
(Ogletree, pp. 135-37, 170-79, 183-236), and gives a behind-the-scenes

look at the author's representation of Anita Hill during the Clarence Thomas

confirmation hearings (Ogletree, pp. 181, 202-17). It discusses the cam

paigns for affirmative action (Ogletree, pp. 81-82, 147-66, 242-56) and
black reparations (Ogletree, pp. 274-93), the defense of Angela Davis

(Ogletree, p. 45), and many other national events in which the author played
a leading part. The reader learns of Ogletree's early years living with strug

gling black parents on the wrong side of the tracks in Merced, California

(Ogletree, pp. 15-40), his undergraduate years at Stanford University (Ogle

tree, pp. 41-56), and his life-changing three years at Harvard Law School

(Ogletree, pp. 57-78). It follows him through his term with the nationally

prominent District of Columbia Public Defender Service (Ogletree, pp. 8288) and his entry into teaching law. Photographs of Ogletree in his third

grade class, as his high school's student body president, as an undergraduate

activist at Stanford, and as a young lawyer arguing key cases enliven an al

ready engaging book.
The book's principal leitmotif is integration-the Brown ideal-and the

author's ambivalence about whether the ideal is still worth striving for in the

face of society's increasing indifference (Ogletree, pp. xiv-xvii, 259-73).

Integration provided Ogletree with a first-rate education, yet it failed many

other black students of his generation. In his graduating class of several

hundred, only a handful of the dozens of black students wanted to attend a
four-year college (Ogletree, p. 40). Some cities, such as Boston, resisted
integration bitterly, casting abuse on defenseless black schoolchildren bused
in from the other side of town (Ogletree, pp. 57-71). Others placed black
and brown children in lower academic tracks or in classrooms led by teach

ers who believed them incapable of higher intellectual achievement
(Ogletree, pp. 33, 40). Because society seems content to pursue integration
at "all deliberate speed," Ogletree wonders whether the black community

would not be better off pursuing equal funding (Ogletree, pp. 234-35, 309-

10), neighborhood schools, or one of the newer alternatives such as charter

schools (Ogletree, pp. 261, 267-70) or voucher programs that enable parents

to send their children to any school they believe better than their current one
(Ogletree, pp. 235-36, 261).

1274
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Ogletree ends on a somber note, uncertain how far U.S. society has
come in the fifty years since the Supreme Court decided Brown (Ogletree,
pp. 295-311). He laments the loss of great voices, such as Justice Marshall's
and Martin Luther King, Jr.'s, and the way segregation has begun to creep
back into most of our big cities (Ogletree, p. 297). He concludes by noting
that we stand today on the edge of a precipice and must remain vigilant to
prevent further decline in the realization of the great principles embodied in
this landmark case (Ogletree, pp. 298-303).
B. Michael K. Brown, Martin Carnoy, Elliott Currie,
Troy Duster, David B. Oppenheimer,
Marjorie M. Shultz, and David Wellman, Whitewashing

Race: The Myth of a Color-Blind Society
Since the heyday of the civil-rights movement of the 1960s-the heady
times that Charles Ogletree writes about-the United States has entered a
new phase of race relations, one that emphasizes a color-blind society
(Brown et al., pp. vii-viii, 2-5). This movement has found particular favor
with a series of conservative and neoconservative commentators and writers
including Dinesh D' Souza,26 Jim Sleeper,27 and especially Abigail and
Stephen Thernstrom,28 who argue that the civil-rights movement has suc
ceeded and that any lingering distress in the black community must be due
to cultural factors inherent in that community. 29
30
These "racial realists," according to Brown et al., subscribe to three
tenets (Brown et al., pp. 1-2). First, the civil-rights revolution succeeded
when new laws banished legal segregation and outlawed discrimination in
housing, employment, voting, and most other spheres. Second, if racial ine
quality persists, it is due to black failure, behavioral and cultural. Third,
because the United States has become a color-blind society with only rare,
isolated cases of outright discrimination, race-conscious policies such as
affirmative action are unjustified.
Whitewashing Race confronts these contentions with a scathing refuta
tion, composed of equal parts of terse argument crackling with indignation
and page after page of social-science evidence. If racism lodges within the
26.

E.g., THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL S OCIETY (1995); II.LIBERAL

EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS (1991).

27.
(1997).

E.g., LIBERAL RACISM: How FIXATING ON RACE SUBVERTS THE AMERICAN DREAM

28.

E.g., AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 14; T he Real Story of Black Progress,
J., Sept. 3, 1997, atA20 [hereinafterThemstrom & Themstrom, Real Story].

WALL ST.

29. See, e.g., Brown, et al., pp. 2-17 (describing this neo-conservative view); Themstrom &
Themstrom, Real Story, supra note 28; see also THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK
AND WHITE, supra note 14 (book-length treatment of black deficits and white innocence).
30. The term is Brown's. It introduces an unfortunate confusion; Derrick Bell used the term
much earlier in a quite different sense. See Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 363, 364
(1992) (urging a "racial realist" approach to African American civil rights that recognizes inherent
limitations of civil rights remedies).
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very structures of society, permeates every significant encounter, and per
vades every period in our history, pretending to be color-blind will merely
make matters worse (Brown et al., pp. 35-36). Racial realists deny the exis
tence of structural racism by filtering their evidence and basing their data on
a narrow and outmoded understanding of racism as obvious, intentional,
evil-willed, and individual (Brown et al., p. 35).
Public opinion polls show that smaller and smaller numbers of white
people hate blacks, believe them stupid and inferior, and wish not to associ
ate with them (Brown et al., p. 36). From this, racial realists conclude that
racism is dead. Brown et al. critique these polls and present studies that
show that American attitudes are not nearly as benevolent as the realists like
to imagine (Brown et al., pp. 40-43). Furthermore, much racism today is
unintentional, unstated, quite polite, and even normal (Brown et al., p. 43).
Embedded in a host of behaviors, attitudes, expectations, rules of the game,
and norms is a system of advantage and exclusion that constantly places
whites on top at the expense of others-all without anyone grinding anyone
else under his or her heel (Brown et al., p. 43).
Making use of the concepts of accumulation and disaccumulation
(Brown et al., pp. 22-25, 231-32), Brown and his coauthors show, in sepa
rate chapters about markets (Brown et al., Chapter Two), education (Brown
et al., Chapter Three), crime (Brown et al., Chapter Four), employment and
affirmative action (Brown et al., Chapter Five), and voting (Brown et al., pp.
Chapter Six), how whites have gained opportunities while minorities have
lost them. Needless to say, the studies these authors highlight and the key
moments in history-such as the G.I. Bill and the Federal Housing Act
(Brown et al., pp. 27, 75)-they cite to show how the haves arranged to
come out ahead differ radically from those the conservatives choose to
trumpet.
For example, racial realists argue that since blacks have lower gradua
tion rates at elite colleges than whites, they would be better off attending
less selective schools where the competition is less keen (Brown et al., p.
115). Brown et al. show that minority students are more likely to graduate
from elite schools than their counterparts with similar test scores who attend
less selective schools (Brown et al., p. 116). Brown et al. posit that this is so
because elite colleges tend to have more financial and social resources and
make a point of nurturing and supporting all students (Brown et al., p. 116).
They also point out that the University of Mississippi, a school the realists
tout as a model of equal opportunity because it has a color-blind admissions
policy, graduated only forty-eight percent of its black students, while the
University of Virginia, an elite school that practices affirmative action,
graduated over eighty percent (Brown et al., pp. 124-26). By subjecting
common conservative arguments and assumptions to withering scrutiny,
introducing new social-science evidence, and reanalyzing old data, Brown et
al. forcefully challenge the central tenets of the new conservative racial real
ism. Racism, although subtle, still pervades our institutions and our very
thoughts and will not yield unless we move beyond reassuring bromides
about color-blindness and equal opportunity.
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C. Alexander Tsesis, The Thirteenth Amendment
and American Freedom
Most readers think of the Fourteenth Amendment31 when they think of

civil rights and antidiscrimination remedies. Alexander Tsesis believes that
the Thirteenth Amendment, 3 2 which prohibited slavery and provided that
Congress may effectuate that prohibition through appropriate legislation, is

an underused avenue of civil-rights protection (Tsesis, pp. 6-7). He docu

ments his argument by examining not only the legislative intent behind the

amendment, but also the historical, political, and legal events that were tak

ing place before, during, and after it came into being (Tsesis, pp. 6-7, 3443). His overall thesis is that the Thirteenth Amendment, with its abolitionist
association, can provide civil-rights protections from current practices that

subordinate minorities in a fashion similar to that of slavery without the doc

trinal limitations-such as state action, intent, and an interstate economic

impact-that courts have imposed on Fourteenth Amendment and Com

merce Clause jurisprudence (Tsesis, pp. 3-4, 6-7, 44-46, 112-17, 130-36).
Drawing from Justice Harlan's dissent in Hodges v. United States,3 3 Tse

sis argues that the Thirteenth Amendment not only abolishes slavery but
aims to protect fundamental liberties. The amendment recognizes that slav

ery was not an innate condition, but one that society and the law imposed.

Therefore, the "eradication of slavery . . . should have a social and legal
component for achieving equal liberty" (Tsesis, p. 96). The amendment au

thorizes judges to decide whether laws or actions resemble incidents or

badges of slavery that impede every person's right to lead a fulfilling life

free from indiscriminate uses of official or private power.
For Tsesis, the Thirteenth Amendment allows Congress to advance the
ideals of the Declaration of Independence and Preamble to the Constitu

tion-a free and equal citizenry. Furthermore, it is expansive enough to
counter new and coercive practices in each generation. All repressive con

duct rationally related to impediments of freedom comparable to those that

characterized slavery could be forbidden. If Congress employs Section 2 of
the Amendment in abusive ways that stray from its intended purpose, judi
cial review will check that grant of power (Tsesis, pp. 22-23).
Under current case law, rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress

can only enact remedial measures, not preemptive, substantive laws aimed
at advancing national policies and human flourishing (Tsesis, pp. 46-47).

The Thirteenth Amendment, by contrast, grants Congress the power to pass

substantive guarantees. The case that signified this expansive reading is

Jones

v.

3
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 4 in which Justice Stewart explicitly relied on

the legislative intent, plain meaning, and judicial history of both the Thir31.

U .S CONST. amend XIV.

32.

U.S. CONST. amend. xm.

33. 203 U.S. 1, 20 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Jones
Co. , 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
34.

392 U.S. 409 (1968).

v.

Alfred H. Mayer
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teenth Amendment and various civil-rights statutes to reach the type of dis
criminatory practices that a builder had employed. From this opinion, Tsesis
infers that "Congress has the power . . . rationally to determine what are the
badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that deter
mination into effective legislation" (Tsesis, p. 86).
The amendment can only reach infringements that are analogous to in
voluntary servitude (Tsesis, pp. 97, 117), but Tsesis uses landmark decisions
such as Roe v. Wade,

35

Griswold v. Connecticut,

36

37

and Loving v. Virginia

to

show how courts could combat latter-day infringements more directly and
effectively under this landmark piece of legislation than under contorted
theories of equal protection or due process (Tsesis, pp. 104-36).
Tsesis concludes with an imaginative analysis of recent problems that
have confounded courts and the national imagination, including Confederate
symbols (Tsesis, pp. 97, 137-49) and hate crime (Tsesis, pp. 97, 116, 139,
149-54), in Thirteenth Amendment terms. By guaranteeing personal safety
and stability while banishing symbolic invocations of the horror of slavery,
the Thirteenth Amendment can provide the flexible instrument modern soci
ety needs to forge a future in which all may lead fulfilling and socially
useful lives.

II. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
All three books richly reward the serious reader and, with the few excep
38
are devoid of serious deficiencies. All three are well

tions noted later,

written and engaging; one turns the page eager to see what comes next. All
three incorporate history, social policy, and legal doctrine in intriguing
ways. Each posits a clear, unitary thesis and develops it without unnecessary
elaboration or digression. The reader is never in doubt about where the au
thors are going.
Tsesis's book is perhaps the most audacious and original. Brown and his
coauthors are merciless, almost overwhelming, in their attack on a comfort
able, inbred, conservative orthodoxy that has had its own way without much
serious opposition. They rate high marks for sheer rhetorical and argumenta
tive skill. Ogletree is the best pure storyteller; he knows how to invite the
reader into his world and show what makes it go around. He holds the
reader's attention while recounting events, large and small, over a fifty-year
span-no small feat.
Tsesis's is perhaps the most optimistic of the three books, arguing that
the Thirteenth Amendment can release antidiscrimination law from its cur
rent stranglehold. He offers a blueprint as to how desperately needed
reforms, of the kinds Brown et al. and Ogletree highlight, can come about.
Both Ogletree and Brown et al. are soberly realistic about the failure of
35.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

36.

381 U.S. 479 (1965).

37.

388 U.S. 1 (1967).

38.

See infra Part III.
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integration over the past half century, noting that society has seemed per
versely willing to pay a heavy price for integrating at "all deliberate speed."
White Americans uncomplainingly underwrite �'the prisons, police, mopping
up health care services, and other reactive measures predictably required by
the maintenance of drastically unequal social conditions" (Brown et al., p.
249). They also pay in terms of lost competitiveness and depressed perform
ance of the U.S. economy (Brown et al., p. 249; Tsesis, p. 110).
Ogletree and Brown et al. highlight more clearly than does Tsesis the
need for extralegal forces and social activism in advancing a broad civil
rights agenda. Like Ogletree, Brown and his colleagues show how white
America must share power and resources with those whom it has grown
accustomed to excluding from these goods. It must also make sacrifices in
standards of living to achieve a fair and stable society (Brown et al., p. 228;
Ogletree, p. 299). Brown et al. make plain that policies designed to combat
racial inequality must also proceed with awareness of the complex relation
ships between race and class. Intelligently chosen policies-such as a higher
minimum wage-will benefit people of all races and stave off accusations
and resentment (Brown et al., p. 230).
The books suffer minor flaws. Tsesis should have addressed objections
to his position. For example, could not a conservative Supreme Court im
pose limitations on Thirteenth Amendment analysis just as it has on the
other bases for civil-rights protection? Ogletree never addresses what could
rekindle lost enthusiasm for black causes in a way comparable to the role
international appearances and the threat of domestic disruption played in
bringing about Brown v. Board of Education.39 Brown and his coauthors fo
cus their indignation almost exclusively on Stephen and Abigail Themstrom
and a few other neoconservative opponents of race-conscious remedies,
overlooking other critics of affirmative action who warrant attention as
well.40
When Ogletree discusses affirmative action, he points out that the diver
41
sity argument currently in favor masks the real, substantive reasons why it
is still needed (Ogletree, p. 165). After all, if diversity is the real goal in
higher education, why limit it to the two or three groups that have suffered
historical oppression? He correctly points out that "[t]his is a particularly
difficult question in a time [of] disconnect between the past injustices and
oppression faced by blacks and the experience of current generations of
whites, whose only exposure to racial classifications is their use in providing

39. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Commentary, Brown v. Board of Education and the lnterest
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524-26 (1980).
40.

E.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE EcoNOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971); RICHARD A.

EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992);
GLENN C. LOURY, ONE BY ONE FROM THE INSIDE OUT: EsSAYS AND REVIEWS ON RACE AND RE
SPONSIBILITY IN AMERICA (1995); CHARLES MURRAY, LoSING GROUND (1984); THOMAS SOWELL,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AROUND THE WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL S TUDY (2004); THOMAS SOWELL,
ETHNIC AMERICA: A HISTORY

(1981 ).

41. That is, that affirmative action is needed to diversify universities and workplaces that
otherwise rrtight be practically all white.
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benefits to minority groups" (Ogletree, pp. 164-65). The other authors offer
nothing nearly so astute in their discussions of affirmative action. Tsesis
comes closest when he observes that "[t]he nation rises or falls as a whole,"
so that helping promising minority students gain admission to top schools,
where they will receive a first-rate education, not only helps heal old
wounds, but also benefits the nation as a whole (Tsesis, p. 110).
On the whole, these are strong, original books that should be on the
bookshelf of every American interested in finding solutions to one of the
United States' most intractable problems.
III. THE DOG THAT DIDN 'T BARK
A Incorporating White Privilege into Racial Analysis

Most civil-rights scholarship focuses on discrimination visited on people
of color, women, and other outgroups. What of actions that do not discrimi
nate against such groups but instead entrench white privilege? In a typical
civil-rights violation, an empowered person, usually a white, commits an act
of discrimination-such as hate speech, denial of a job, or rejection of a
housing loan-against a black or Latino of lesser power and social standing.
This may happen with or without conscious intent, and the act may be indi
vidual, institutional, or a matter of social custom. The common thread is that
they all render a member of a historically disenfranchised group worse off.
Suppose, however, that the member of the dominant group acts not to
disfavor such an individual, but to benefit another member of his or her own
group? This ubiquitous practice raises the issue of white privilege: a series
of interlocking favors, courtesies, benefits, and customs by which the domi
nant group confers gains on one of its own.42 It includes the artfully crafted
letter of recommendation that a teacher writes for a favorite white student,
but does not write for the black student in the rear row who shows flashes of
real talent.43
White privilege includes suburban families who hire each other's chil
dren, one to tend the yard while the family is away, the other to babysit its
children; or, when they are older, provide them with summer internships in
each other's companies to pad their resumes for college.44 It includes

42. See STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED (1996) (analyzing the many varie
ties of white privilege); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993); Peggy Mcintosh,
White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences
T hrough Work in Women's Studies (Wellesley Coll. Ctr. for Research on Women, Working Paper No.
189, 1988); see also MAURICE BERGER, WHITE LIES (1999) (discussing how white supremacy and
institutional racism limit the life chances of people of color); GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE
INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS (1998) (same).

43. Richard Delgado, 1998 Hugo L Black Lecture: Ten Arguments Against Affirmative Ac
tion-How Valid?, 50 ALA. L. REV. 135, 150 (1998).
44.

Id.

Michigan Law Review

1280
conversational gambits,

[Vol. i04:1269

45

workplace expectations and norms that reward
46
and police officers who let neatly dressed
4
white motorists off with a warning. 7 It indlides companies that hire through

familiarity with white culture,

the grapevine, so that African-American or Latino candidates have fewer
4
chances of coming to their attention than do well-connected whites. 8 It in
cludes a host of other arrarigements, large and small, by which comfortably

placed people help, reward, and validate their own.

Is this a civil-rights issue? Yes. White privilege acts, like discrimination,

as a socially stratifying force, but from the opposite direction. By concen

trating wealth, comfort, and well-being, it polarizes society and widens the

gap between the haves and the have-nots. Imagine a society that consists of

two groups, the As and the Bs. More powerful and numerous than the Bs,
the As tacitly agree to oppress them for fun and profit. They circulate stories
and myths that the Bs are stupid and lazy. They exclude them from the best

jobs, schools, and neighborhoods.

Then one day the As undergo a change of heart. They realize that dis

crimination is wrong and stop visiting it on the Bs. But the As still like each
other best, and so continue favoring each other in a multitude of ways while

excluding the Bs from their bounty. After active discrimination in the grind

ing-someone-under-your-heel sense ended, would the Bs begin enjoying

upward mobility, move into nice neighborhoods, get into good schools, win

places in the Senate, and become CEOs of major corporations? If their old
bete noir, the A group, deploys selective privilege to aid each other but not
the Bs, the latter's progress will be slow indeed.

Privilege and discrimination, then, are like two sides of a coin. They rep

licate social relations in similar ways. One operates to submerge and

eliminate the competition; the other to elevate and favor one's own kind. It

is easy to deny that one is a racist. It is harder to deny that one is the benefi

ciary of privilege or that one has on occasion doled it out to a favorite friend
49

or relative.

45. Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the /mponance of Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other -Isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397.
46.

Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000) .

47.

Mcintosh, supra note 42.

48. Daniel Gross, In the Loop: A Lucrative Place to Be: The More Contacts You Have, The
More You'll Be Paid, Study Says, INT'L HERALD Turn., Aug. 24, 2004, at Fin./Bus. 13 (interview
with KennethArrow).
49. A rare example of judicial recognition of the need to consider white privilege and su
premacy occurred in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. l (1967), a Supreme Court decision striking down
a Virginia antimiscegenation statute. In Loving, an interracial couple challenged their state's Racial
Integrity Act, which prohibited marriages between whites and nonwhites, on equal protection and
due process grounds. Id. at 2, 6. The trial judge had suspended their sentences on condition that they
leave the state and not return together for twenty-five years. Id. at 3. He rationalized his order by
reasoning:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on
separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause
for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the
races to mix.

May 2006]

The Current Landscape of Race

1281

B. Beyondthe Black- White Paradigm of Race
An emerging racial paradigm takes into account the fortunes of all the
major ethnic groups of color, as well as whites.so It treats race and racism
not as a series of localized flaws in an otherwise functional system, but as a
broad feature affecting much of social life.st Race cannot be understood
piecemeal, by examining its function in just one area alone. It requires atten
tion to a host of factors cutting across several fields of knowledge and

Id. At the time, Virginia was one of sixteen states that prohibited intermarriages, many of them
through laws dating back to slavery. Id. at 6 n.5.

On appeal, Virginia argued that its statute complied with equal protection because whites and
nonwhites were similarly disadvantaged-neither could marry each other. Id. at 7-8. Brushing aside
this argument, the Court found "no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial
discrimination" to justify the statute. Id. at 11. "(T]hat Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages
involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justifi
cation, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy." Id. It also went on to hold that the
statute denied the Lovings liberty without due process of law. Id. at 12. Since marriage is one of the
"basic civil rights of man/ ' to deny its exercise as Virginia did violated a fundamental right without
adequate justification. Id.
The Court's reasoning goes far beyond merely noticing that Virginia's criminal statute classi
fied on the basis of race and thus violated the color-blind norm. Noting that Virginia's law left
minorities free to marry members of their own group or of other minority groups, the Court con
cluded that it could be aimed only at protecting the purity of the white race. Id. at 11-12. lf purity of
the other races were important, the statute would have prohibited blacks, Asians, Indians, and Lati
nos from marrying each other. Id. at 11 n.11. Instead, it only prevented them from marrying, as
Richard Loving did, a member of the white race.
The statute, then, looked beyond the usual evils that summon up equal protection: lack of
color-blindness, racial classification, and unequal treatment of persons and groups that are similarly
situated. It aimed to set whites on a marital-and perhaps eugenic-pedestal: pure, undefiled, and
superior. The Court spent little time addressing the reasonableness of the classification-whether
Virginia could demonstrate a compelling interest, and whether the statute was calculated to advance
that interest in narrowly tailored fashion. Redolent of white supremacy, it could not stand regardless
of whether the mandates of conventional equal protection doctrine were satisfied. It stood, justifia
bly, on a higher plane of constitutional suspicion.
The only Supreme Court decision to confront white supremacy and privilege, loving v. Vir
ginia would seem to offer a promising starting point for a jurisprudence trained on those concepts.
Such a jurisprudence would explore such issues as:
Which practices and laws advance white privilege and well-being at the expense of other
groups?
Which practices and laws entrench privilege and superior status so deeply and irreversi
bly that a society committed to equal opportunity should not tolerate them?
What tests and criteria of cultural meaning can we use to aid ourselves in recognizing
practices of white privilege?
Future scholarship might well examine these and related questions, including the line-drawing
challenges that are certain to arise: How blatantly must the measure benefit whites? Suppose the
benefit concerns not marriage or another fundamental right, but an ordinary economic benefit, such
as tax breaks for the rich-most of whom just happen to be white? Suppose the conduct is largely
private, such as marital choices, or partly private and partly public, such as a standardized test in use
by private and public schools that rewards familiarity with white culture? Might a white-supremacist
measure ever be justified by a compelling state interest, such as wartime security? See Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
50.

See sources cited supra note 21.

51. JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMER
ICA (2000) (offering broad coverage of civil rights and featuring each group of color, plus whites);
Perea, supra note 21.
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affecting the fortunes of whites, blacks, Latinos, Arabs, Asian Americans,
and Native Americans in complex ways.52
The new paradigm made its first appearance in fields other than law,
55
such as labor history,53 whiteness studies, 54 immigration studies, and ethnic
56
histories. A few legal scholars now incorporate this approach into their
57
work. A few, such as Juan Perea, have actively contributed to its develop
58
ment. One recent treatment by a legal scholar demonstrated in detail
exactly how ignoring the history of nonblack minority groups has backfired
to the detriment of blacks on many occasions and how treating other groups
as mere ancillaries to the black cause deprives blacks of much-needed al
lies.59
A racial paradigm that places one group-usually African Americans
in the center and takes cognizance of the other groups only insofar as they
succeed in analogizing themselves to the central group suffers a second
drawback: it is apt to provide a poor quality of justice to the groups it lo
6()
cates on the margin. These other groups will receive redress for racial
wrongs only to the extent to which they prove that what happened to them
would have been actionable had it happened to an African American.61 Re
call the example of the Filipino who could not recover for accent
discrimination because our system of antidiscrimination remedies contained
nothing that squarely addressed his predicament.62 Latinos complaining of
discrimination on account of suspected illegal status, Asian Americans who
receive diffident treatment because of the model-minority myth, or Native
52. See, e.g., PEREA ET AL., supra note 51; Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell's Toolkit-Fit to
Dismantle that Famous House?, 75 N.Y.U. L. RE v. 283 (2000).
53.

See DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE

AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (rev. ed.

1999)

(discussing the role of work and unions in assimilating

early immigrant groups); see also DAVID R. ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF WHITENESS:
EsSAYS ON RACE, POLITICS, AND WORKING CLASS HISTORY (1994) (showing how several racial
forces interacted in the construction of white identity).

54.

See CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: ·LooKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado & Jean
1997); PEREA ET AL., supra note 51, at 429-99.

Stefancic eds.,

55. See RICHARD D. ALBA , ETHNIC IDENTITY: THE TRANSFORMATION
(1990) (reporting a classic study of ethnic white immigrants).
56.

OF WHITE AMERICA

See Elizabeth Martinez, Beyond Black/White: The Racisms of Our 1ime, Soc. JusT.,

Spring-Summer 1993, at
white interactions).

22

(urging that contemporary racism is not merely a matter of black and

57.

See sources cited supra note 21; PEREA ET AL., supra note 51.

58.

See Perea, supra note 21.

59. See Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell's Toolkit: Fit to Dismantle That Famous House?, 75
N.Y.U. L. REV. 283 (2000).
60.

See id.

61. See id. Recall, for example, how some African Americans were disappointed when Grut
ter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), protected affirmative action as an aspect of advancing whites'
interest in an effective economy and military. See David B. Wilkins, From "Separate Is Inherently
Unequal" to "Diversity Is Good for Business": T he Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and
the Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HAR V. L. RE V. 1548 (2004). The Grutter opinion, in short,
protected black interest as an aspect of whites'. Id.
62.

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Americans thought to be favored children of federal largess also will be un
able to recover. 63
IV. LOOKING FOR SIGNS OF THE NEW PARADIGM
IN B ROWN, OGLETREE, AND TSESIS

Few legal writers consider white privilege when writing about racial dis
crimination, and fewer still consider the complex dynamics that the demise
of the black-white binary of race brings to light. As a result, many strong
books lose analytical force as well as real-world applicability.
How do the authors under review fare in these respects? Brown et al. are
best at addressing white privilege. Employing the notions of social accumu
lation and disaccumulation, they examine the means by which whites have
assured themselves a dominant position generation after generation so that
although blacks advance, the gap between them and whites remains constant
(Brown et al., pp. 17-25, 231-32). Discussions of this kind are rarer in Tse
sis or Ogletree, and even more so in other recent books about race. 64
Ogletree does note how well-off whites have established selective colleges
and universities for their youth, like the ones he managed to attend, and have
sent their sons and daughters there year after year (Ogletree, pp. 41-56).
Other than this, white privilege is largely missing from his book. Tsesis is
mainly concerned with old-fashioned discrimination and the many ways
society deprives blacks of a full and enjoyable life. He devotes little atten
tion to what is occurring on the other side of the equation and the dozens of
ways by which whites help each other advance to the exclusion of others.
Both authors could have incorporated white privilege to good advantage.
Ogletree might, for example, have discussed how he felt as an undergradu
ate at Stanford, surrounded by products of the nation's best prep schools, or
how his colleagues in legal services defended their hiring policies, which
largely excluded blacks, by falling back on the idea of merit. For his part,
Tsesis might have shown how slave labor laid the foundation for white
wealth, which continued long after abolition.
Turning to the black-white binary of race, Ogletree, who grew up in
California, cannot help but mention Latinos at various points-although his
book is primarily about blacks (Ogletree, pp. 32-34, 44, 54-55, 82, 143,
151, 162, 260-63, 265-66). He mentions that the composition of his ele
mentary school was heavily black and Latino, and the photographs
reproduced in his book confirm this. In the chapter on his Stanford days,
Latino students make their appearance as fellow demonstrators (Ogletree, p.
55). Later, when he discusses recent trends in school segregation, he again
mentions the fortunes of Latino children (Ogletree, pp. 260-63). Ogletree

63.

See Delgado, supra note 59.

64.

E.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: Brown

v.

Board of Education AND THE UN

(2004) (dwelling mainly on the fortunes of African
Americans and devoting little attention to white privilege and nest-feathering); F. MICHAEL
HIGGINBOTHAM, RACE LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND QUESTIONS (2d ed. 2005) (same).
FULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM
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thus seems relatively ecumenical in his concerns; although Latinos make

only infrequent appearances in his book, they are not entirely absent, nor
does he make any conscious effort to exclude them.

Tsesis's book is a different story. Wedded to an abolitionist theory of ra
cial remediation, Tsesis seems determined to make that single model work
5
for all minorities, even those who have no history of enslavement. 6 This

makes little sense. Whites did not want labor from the Indians, but their
land. Fearless, and with intimate knowledge of the local terrain, Indians
would fight to the death rather than suffer enslavement. Whites wanted

something different from the Mexicans: first, their land, and later, low-paid

migrant agricultural labor in work crews and camps. From Asians, U.S. so
ciety wanted yet another set of commodities: at first, labor in building the
nation's railroads and mines, and later, technical services as the "model mi

nority" keeping the nation's computers and office machines humming

efficiently. 66

This simplified summary points up something that Tsesis and some

other writers ignore: namely, how a theory of black civil rights can do jus

tice to only some of the types of mistreatment society visits on nonblack
groups. The Japanese did not need reparations for slavery; they needed repa

rations for wartime internment. Latinos do not need freedom from the
badges and incidents of slavery but from the badges and incidents of con

quest, including cultural destruction, loss of ancestral lands, and a school
67
system seemingly bent on steadily suppressing their history and language.

A model of redress needs to suit the history and culture of the group for

which it is applied. True, society every now and then will treat Asians or

Latinos as it did the slaves; for example, forcing them into coolie labor or

onto farm-worker crews with few freedoms or opportunities to leave and
6
pursue other options. 8 In these circumstances, nothing is wrong with apply

ing an abolitionist model or a statute derived from that tradition. But, as
explained earlier, other groups experience many indignities that African
69
Trying to force these into a paradigm not de

Americans ordinarily do not.

signed for them guarantees poor results.

Tsesis's book fares poorly on this score although it fares well in other
respects. What about Brown et al.? Whitewashing Race is gratifyingly broad

in its treatment of white privilege and racial hoarding (Brown et al., pp. 2225, 231-32), and is properly scathing in its criticism of administrators and
65. In a faculty workshop, I asked the author if his Thirteenth Amendment approach would
work for all minorities. He insisted it would. Alexander Tsesis, Address at the University of Pitts
burgh Law School (Nov. 2004) (notes on file with author).
66.

On the model-minority myth, see PEREA

ET AL, supra

note 51, at 412, 413-16, 419, 980.

67. On the role of conquest in Latino history, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo and Revision
ism: Relearning the Lessons of History, 99 Nw. U. L. R..E v. 805, 824-32 (2005) (book review); Juan
F. Perea, A Brief History of Race and the U. S.-Mexican Border: Tracing the Trajectories of Con
quest, 51 UCLA L. R EV. 283 (2003).
68. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. Nat'! Labor Relations Bd., 535 U.S. 137
(2002); PEREA ET AL, supra note 51, at 31 2-16, 320, 369-70, 395-97, 416-21.
69.

See supra notes 17-20 and 46-48 and accompanying text.

The Current Landscape of Race

May 2006 )

1 285

policy planners who enacted legislation that enabled whites to get ahead at
the expense of minorities (Brown et al., pp. 75-79, 92-93). Despite this, its
treatment of nonblack minorities is confounding. In the introduction, these
California authors explain that they "focus largely on black and white . . .
because the conservative consensus on race is mostly constructed around the
relationship between black and white" (Brown et al., p. x). True to their
promise, Latinos, Asians, and Indians are virtually absent from their pages;
their discussion proceeds almost entirely in black-white binary terms.
This, of course, is merely to explain racism with more racism. Further
more, it is simply untrue. Conservatives such as Samuel Huntington70 and
Peter Brimelow71 have written forceful and ugly books about Latino cultural
inferiority; the cable news pundits editorialize against this group regularly; 72
and fearful voters in the authors' own state enacted three referenda-English
74
73
Only, Proposition 18? (which denied immigrants public services, includ
ing education), and the California Civil Rights Initiative, Proposition 20975
(the antiaffirmative action measure)-aimed at the Latino population. When
Brown and his coauthors blithely declare Latinos irrelevant to racial analy
sis, one wonders whether they read their own newspapers or realized that
their state is nearly one-third Latino but only 6.7 percent black.
Brown et al. explain that discrimination against African Americans is
older than that against the other groups (Brown et al., pp. ix-x), shapes indi
vidual housing choices in a way that antipathies toward the other groups do
not (p. xi), and is a foundational part of U.S. culture and history (Brown et
al., p. x) (in short, black exceptionalism). These rationalizations are unwor
thy of serious social scientists. All the groups are exceptional-blacks
suffered slavery; Indians suffered removal and extermination (what could be
more foundational than that?); Mexican Americans suffered conquest and
the loss of one-half of their country in a pretextual war, followed by colonial
occupation and suppression of culture, language, and land tenure. Puerto
Rico is a United States colony, pure and simple. Japanese Americans were
interned during World War II, losing businesses, homes, and farms on the
strength of fabricated evidence, merely because they looked like the wartime

70.
IDENTITY

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE?: THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S NATIONAL
243 (2004) (warning that America's core values could suffer dilution if too many Latino

immigrants gain admission).

71.
DISASTER

PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S IMMIGRATION

(1995) (warning against disastrous consequences of excessive immigration).

72. For instance, Lou Dobbs in his "Broken Borders" series and in other segments on Lou
Dobbs Tonight exhibits thinly veiled hostility toward Mexican immigrants. See, e.g., Lou Dobbs
Tonight (CNN television broadcast Oct. 12, 2005), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/
TRANSCRIPTS/ldt.html; Lou Dobbs Tonight (CNN television broadcast Aug. 23, 2005), available
at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/ldt.html.
73. CAL. CONST. art. m § 6(b) (providing that English is the official language in a state with
a heavy Latino population).
74.

See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995).

75.

CAL. CONST. art. I §

31

(providing that the state shall not discriminate or grant preferen

tial treatment on the basis of race and a number of other factors).
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enemy.76 While blacks may be slightly more segregated than Latinos in
housing, the latter are the most segregated group in public schools and suf
fer by far the highest dropout rate.77
One wonders whether Brown et al., would have done better not to ex
plain or attempt to justify their decision to omit nonblack groups at all. After
all, nothing is wrong with writing about one minority group, as Ogletree
did, but it should be done without insulting the others or trivializing their
experience. The reader does miss out on the big picture, but for some pur
poses it may be perfectly sensible to limit one's coverage in that respect. It
is not necessary to demean the other groups or their suffering at the same
time. Moreover, to imply, as Brown and his coauthors do, that Latinos and
Asians are irrelevant to racial analysis, especially in today's climate, simply
beggars belief.
CONCLUSION: ONCE THE DOG BARKS, T HEN

WHAT?

These three books, excellent in many ways, exhibit some of the best fea
tures of recent writing about race. One-Tsesis's--deploys legal history and
doctrinal innovation in the search for a way to avoid the many hurdles that
the Supreme Court has placed in the way of civil-rights remedies. Ogletree
expertly uses legal storytelling in his account of a half-century of civil-rights
history so as to rekindle conscience and engage the sympathies of readers
with sympathy to share. Brown and his coauthors marshal an impressive
array of social-science evidence to refute the central teachings of a new
school of tough-love neoconservative critics of race-conscious remedies.
Inadequate coverage of white privilege mars two of the books, and ne
glect of issues affecting nonblack minorities, such as Asian Americans,
Arabs, Native Americans, and Latinos, blights all three. Writers attempting
to make sense of the United States' racial predicament must expand their
analysis to take account of these two issues. They must pay attention to
white privilege-to what is taking place on the other side of the racial di
vide-just as they must consider the fortunes of nonblack groups-certainly
when these intersect with those of blacks, but especially when they do not.

76. Other U.S. citizens looked like wartime enemies-the Germans and Italians-yet were
not interned.
77. See Richard Delgado, Locating Latinos in the Field of Civil Rights: Assessing the Neo
liberal Case for Radical Exclusion, 83 Tux. L. REV. 489, 503-04 & nn .90-9 1 (2004) (book review).

